
# Spearing Superfish with HPKP

### Stuart Larsen Yahoo Paranoids - Pentest




### **Overview**


- The Problem
- HPKP
- Lenovo Superfish Certificate
- Conclusion




Mom: "Why can't you read porn like a normal boy?"


#### Trusted CAs:







To the user, everything looks okay.



# Is this a real problem?

- ComodoHacker: <u>http://en.wikipedia.</u> org/wiki/Comodo\_Group#Certificate\_hacking
- DigiNotar: <u>http://arstechnica.</u> <u>com/security/2011/08/earlier-this-year-an-</u> <u>iranian/</u>
- More?

# HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)

"instructs web clients to associate specific cryptographic identities with a certain web server to prevent MITM attacks dues to compromised Certificate Authorities"

### **Public-Key-Pins Header**

Public-Key-Pins:

pin-sha256="klO23nT2ehFDXCfx3eHTDRESMz3asj1muO+4aldjiuY="; pin-sha256="IN1y/s/iJ+9dzXOhnh5sMzqPV6gmsYM9tLlO5iaCwSA="; max-age=30;

includeSubdomains;


report-uri="hpkp\_report"

```
Last-Modified: Mon, 11 May 2015 14:56:58 GMT
public-key-pins: pin-sha256="kl023nT2ehFDXCfx3eHTDRESMz3asj1mu0+4aIdjiu
Y="; pin-sha256="IN1y/s/iJ+9dzX0hnh5sMzqPV6gmsYM9tLl05iaCwSA="; max-age=30;
includeSubdomains; report-uri="hpkp_report"
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=60; includeSubDomains;
X-Powered-By: Express
```

### **Public-Key-Pins Header**


- pin-sha256:
  - base 64 encoding of a hashed Subject Public Key Info
- max-age:
  - number of seconds to save host pinning
- includeSubDomains: (optional)
  - tells the client to apply pinned host to subdomains as well
- report-uri: (optional)
  - If there is a violation, where should it be reported

## What is a Pin




For Examples:


pin-sha256=abc



- A pin can be any certificate in the chain
- When publishing a policy, two of the pins must be in different trust chains
- You can publish a pin at different levels of the chain
- Backup CSRs



### **Public Key Pinning**



#### **Public Key Pinning** Wednesday insecure ca Hmmm, is Yahoo!'s SPKI in Subject: my pinset? Root CA yahoo.com **NO! STOP** $(\partial$ CONNECTION Inter CA SPKI: jkl 0 0 Subject: yahoo.com MITM SPKI: abc **HPKP** No Secrets Agency pin-sha256=abc pin-sha256=def Valid Certificate. But bad SPKI pin-sha256=ghi

## Lenovo and Superfish

- Pre-installed adware for displaying Ads in Google searches
- The adware came from a company called Superfish

Web Images

News

More -Search tools

About 1,300,000 results (0.31 seconds)

#### Intel® Dual Band Wireless-AC 7260 Plus Bluetooth\* www.intel.ie/content/www/.../dual-band-wireless-ac-7260-bluetooth.html -

Intel® Dual Band Wireless-AC 7260 Wi-Fi and Bluetooth\* adapter provides faster connection speeds, higher capacity, and longer battery life.

#### Visual Search results

£107.99

UK Office



AE6000 Mini Dual Band Advanced Multimedia Wireless-AC £43.13 Euroffice co.uk



Asus DSL-AC68U Wireless Router £159.99 PC World



Video Pro

£167.99

UK Office



Powered by VisualDiscovery

Genelec 7260 APM £1,619.24 Thomann



### The Problem of Superfish

- Google Search uses HTTPS
- So Lenovo pre-installed self signed root certificate
- The same certificate was on all infected machines
- The encryption key was trivially crackable
- Check here: <u>https://superphish.com</u>

## Superfish MITM

- Any malicious actor can use this certificate to MITM *any* website.
- Which completely negates HTTPS, meaning passwords, bank statements, emails, messages are visible again
- It also gives nation states, ISPs, backbone providers another vector for information snooping

### The Embarrassing Part of the Talk

- Can't we just apply HPKP to the Superfish certificate?
- The Superfish certificate won't be in any pinned certificate chains.

• Turns out it doesn't quite work that way

### **HPKP: Locally Installed Certificates**

#### What about MITM proxies, Fiddler etc?

There are a number of cases where HTTPS connections are intercepted by using local, ephemeral certificates. These certificates are signed by a root certificate that has to be manually installed on the client. Corporate MITM proxies may do this, several anti-virus/parental control products do this and debugging tools like <u>Fiddler</u> can also do this. Since we cannot break in these situations, user installed root CAs are given the authority to override pins. We don't believe that there will be any incompatibility issues.

# HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)

"instructs web clients to associate specific cryptographic identities with a certain web server to prevent MITM attacks dues to compromised Certificate Authorities"

### Conclusion

- The Problem
- HPKP
- Lenovo Superfish Certificate

### **Questions?**